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BURNS H. WESTONtON FEBRUARY 18, 1963, the United States Supreme Court issued a
Writ of Certiorari in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.1 It
is one of the most important and controversial cases involving the
nationalization of alien property to arise in recent years. As such, it has
been the subject of extensive scholarly comment. Most commentators,
however, have focused upon the conflicts of laws questions presented by
the interposition of the Act of State Doctrine.2 Only a few have broached,
- Members of the New York State Bar.
1 372 U.S. 905 (1963), reviewing 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), affirming 193 F. Supp.
375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) [hereinafter cited as "Banco Nacional"].
2 See, e.g., Coerper, The Act of State Doctrine in the Light of the Sabbatino Case,
56 Am. J. INT'L L. 143 (1962); Domke and Baade, Nationalization of Foreign-Owned
Property and the Act of State Doctrine-Two Speeches, 1963 DuKE L.J. 269; Falk,
Toward a Theory of the Participation of Domestic Courts in the International Legal
Order: A Critique of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 16 RUTERs L. REv. 1
(1961); Lillich, A Pyrrhic Victory at Foley Square: The Second Circuit and Sabbatino,
8 VILL. L. Rzv. 155 (1963); Reeves, The Cuban Situation: The Political and Economic
Relations of the United States and Cuba, 17 Bus. LAw. 980 (1962); Stevenson, The
Sabbatino Case-Three Steps Forward and Two Steps Back, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 97 (1963).
The case is also commented upon and noted in 4 ARiz. L. Rv. 78 (1962); 3 B.C. IND.
9- Comar. L. REv. 282 (1962); 49 CALIF. L. Rlv. 979 (1961); 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1278
(1962); 47 CORNELL L.Q. 659 (1962); 11 DE PAUL L. Rrv. 765 (1962); 30 FORDHAm L. REv.
523 (1962); 75 HARV. L. REv. 1607 (1962); 47 IowA L. Rv. 765 (1962); 60 MICH. L. REV.
231 (1961); 8 N.Y.L.F. 148 (1962); 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 155 (1962); 34 ROCKY MT. L. REV.
563 (1961); 36 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 159 (1961); 14 STAN. L. REv. 172 (1961); 13 SYRAcusE
L. RFv. 165 (1961); 1962 Wis. L. REv. 386; 111 U. PA. L. REv. 842 (1963); 110 U. PA. L.
Rv. 122 (1961); 23 U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 816 (1962).
It is arguable however, that Banco Nacional is not an Act of State case at all. Plain-
tiff was not a former property owner seeking to invalidate the title of a third party
who had allegedly acquired title from the depriving State. Instead, plaintiff was the
agent of the depriving State itself and was seeking enforcement of its nationalization
measure in our courts. In traditional Act of State cases, however, a domestic court's
reluctance to review the validity of a third party's title reflects an unwillingness to
shift the loss to a third party purchaser for value. This has led courts to make en-
forcement of the doctrine depend upon such ephemeral concepts as retroactive recogni-
tion in order to validate title, or upon public policy or deference to the Executive to
strike it down. The foreign government whose act is questioned is not a litigant in
such cases and is not directly affected by the decision. See generally, Reeves, Act of
State Doctrine and Rule of Law-A Reply, 54 Am. J. INT'L L. 141 (1960); Zander, The
Act of State Doctrine, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 826 (1959); 75 HARv. L. REv. 1607 (1962).
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and then only briefly, the remaining issues raised 3-those bearing upon
that area of customary international law commonly called the Interna-
tional Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Person and Property
of Aliens. 4 This essay seeks to explore these remaining provocative is-
sues from a policy oriented perspective.
It is here postulated that the district court and the court of appeals,
without adequate appraisal invoked and applied normatively ambiguous
and ostensibly self-actuating "rules" largely inspired by pre-World War
I events-rules which reflect more the cultural preferences of the investing
community than the realities of the contemporary world. We believe that
the viability of the Law of State Responsibility would be vastly enhanced
were putative principles divorced from contexts in which they have
dubious significance and vindicated as meaningful guidelines for judicial
inquiry where they have genuine relevance.
The performance of this task-that is, the rational search for and ap-
plication of policy to a world of acts and events which confront the
decision-maker and actually condition his decision-cannot be achieved
by the mere repetition of inherited abstractions. At the very least, a
decision-maker must realistically examine the nature of the claimants
and their objectives, appraise the full factual context within which the
claims have arisen, clarify the community policies at stake in the case
presented and make a discriminating analysis of the potential grounds
for decision based upon the foregoing inquiry. It is hoped that such a
policy oriented analysis of all the factors which surely influenced the
district court and the court of appeals in Banco Nacional will help to
minimize the widespread misconception that economic, political and
social considerations are not "legal" considerations and, therefore, ir-
relevant in resolving disputes under international law. 5
I. THE CLAIMANTS AND THEIR OBJECTIVES
On October 10, 1960, Banco Nacional de Cuba, financial agent of the
Republic of Cuba,6 brought suit to recover proceeds derived from the
sale of a sugar consignment by plaintiff's assignor, a wholly-owned Cuban
3 See Falk, supra note 2; Reeves, supra note 2; Stevenson, supra note 2; 49 CALIF. L.
REv. 979 (1961).
4 Hereinafter called "the Law of State Responsibility."
5 For excellent expositions of this misconception, see KAPLAN & KATZENBACH, THE
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAv cl. 1 (1961); McDOUGAL, Perspectives
for an International Law of Human Dignity, STUDIES m WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 987-1019
(1960).
6 The bank was organized under the laws of the Republic of Cuba in 1948. At the
commencement of this action, fifty per cent of its capital stock plus one share was
owned by the Cuban Government. It was subsequently reorganized and is now wholly-
owned by the Republic of Cuba. Brief for Appellant, p. 2, Banco Nacional, 307 F.2d
845 (2d Cir. 1962).
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Government corporation. The complaint alleged conversion by Farr,
Whitlock & Co., an American commodity broker which had negotiated
the sale, and Peter Sabbatino, court-appointed receiver for Compaffla
Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey, 7 a nationalized American-owned Cuban
corporation and original owner of the sugar in question.8 Defendants
Farr-Whitlock and Sabbatino answered that plaintiff Banco Nacional had
no title to the sugar because it was located outside Cuba's territorial
jurisdiction when C.A.V. was nationalized. While the district court and
the court of appeals rejected this claim, they nevertheless held that Banco
Nacional had no title because the seizure of C.A.V. by the Cuban Govern-
ment was in violation of customary international law since the taking
had not been reasonably related to a public purpose, the nationalization
measure had been discriminatory in nature and the decree had failed to
provide "adequate" compensation. Plaintiff-appellant sought unsuccess-
fully to counter these allegations by claiming that the Act of State Doctrine
prohibits United States courts from adjudicating the legality of the Cuban
nationalization measures.
Although the formal litigants were Banco Nacional, Farr-Whitlock
and Peter Sabbatino (on behalf of C.A.V.), to the extent that the Cuban
and United States Governments assume persuasive roles in determining
the outcome of decision, they must be recognized as claimants in this
case. Thus, while Banco Nacional merely demands payment for the
sugar and damages for its conversion, in reality, Cuba, its principal,
seeks much more: endorsement in the courts of its greatest critic of a
controversial program of socio-economic and political reform which de-
fies more than a half-century of virtually uncontested United States
economic and political influence. And while formal United States par-
ticipation has been limited to statements of judicial deference, 9 the
United States, as a claimant of authority on behalf of all culturally
identified and interested persons and institutions,' 0 is deeply interested
7 Hereinafter called "C.A.V."
8 Peter Sabbatino was appointed receiver at the request of a shareholder of the
nationalized American-owned Cuban sugar company in Schwartz v. Compailia Azucarera
Vertientes Camaguey de Cuba, 28 Misc. 2d 355, 208 N.Y.S.2d 833, aff'd, 12 App. Div.
2d 506, 207 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1960), pursuant to N.Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr, § 977(b), which
provides for the appointment of a receiver to manage the remaining assets of a dis-
solved or nationalized foreign corporation for the benefit of stockholders or creditors
in the State of New York.
9 On October 18, 1961, the Legal Adviser to the State Department stated in a letter
addressed to counsel for the amici that "whether or not the nationalizations will in
the future be given effect in the United States is, of course, for the courts to deter-
mine." In a subsequent letter, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs wrote:
"Our conclusion, in which the Secretary concurs, is that the Department should not
comment on matters pending before the courts." Quoted in 307 F.2d at 858.
10 This is immediately exemplified by the various amici who seek to influence the
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in the ultimate outcome of Banco Nacional. Avowedly at loggerheads
with Cuba since May 17, 1959, when, with passage of the Agrarian Reform
Law, Cuba began seizing American-owned properties, on July 6, 1960,
the United States sharply reduced the Cuban sugar import quota." This
action precipitated on the same day the passage in Havana of Law No.
851, pursuant to which the Cuban Government on August 6, 1960,
promulgated Executive Power Resolution No. 1, nationalizing C.A.V.
Thus, its vicarious interest in the economic well being of American na-
tionals owning ninety per cent of the outstanding stock of C.A.V. aside,
the United States Government is vitally concerned with the outcome of
this case since the acts and events which served as its genesis seriously
challenged goals of United States foreign policy. 12
Given the identities and the objectives of the formal and informal
claimants, it is dear that the case involves far more than the ownership
of $175,250.69 in sugar proceeds.' 3 The district court and the court of
appeals, in effect, were also called upon to resolve, against a background
of fear and animosity, an aspect of that politico-economic conflict be-
tween collectivism and individualism which today divides the world
community into opposing ideological camps.14 Whether these courts
were properly qualified to meet the challenge thus posed is a question
which we do not here seek to resolve.' 5 The underlying conflict must be
recalled, however, when exploring not only the unique facts of the case
but also the myriad variables of the world social and power processes
which inevitably affect both the formal and informal claimants and the
decision makers whose authority they invoked.
outcome of this decision. These include the Cuban-American Sugar Company, the
Cuban American Sugar Mills Company, the Pan-American Life Insurance Company,
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the United States Department
of Justice. A more detailed statement of interested parties than can here be undertaken,
however, would include the many public agencies, private associations and individual
persons who, directly or indirectly, will be affected by the outcome of this decision.
11 Exec. Order No. 3355, 25 Fed. Reg. 6414 (1960), acting pursuant to authority
granted by Public Law 86-592, 74 Stat. 380, amending the Sugar Act of 1948.
12 The United States Government, intent upon its well publicized policy of economic
isolation of the Castro regime, is undoubtedly not only opposed to making the sugar
proceeds available to Cuba, but also unwilling to accept any endorsement of the
Cuban seizures, which it has several times criticized despite (or, perhaps, as exemplified
by) its deference to our judiciary. See, e.g., 43 DEP'T STATE BULL., No. 1100, pp. 141-42.
In 43 DEP'T STATE BULL., No. 1101, p. 171, the United States characterized Cuban Law
No. 851 as arbitrary, confiscatory and discriminatory.
13 This comprises the total amount of sugar proceeds derived from the sale, as
noted by Judge Dimock in 193 F. Supp. at 376. Farr-Whitlock's commission of approxi-
mately $1,300 would be deducted prior to final payment.
14 While we have here posed the two extremes of the world power and social proc-
esses, we recognize that there is a scale of infinite gradations between them and the
positions of the power blocs which they represent.
15 A perceptive analysis of this question may be found in Falk, supra note 2.
[Vol. 31:63
BANCO NACIONAL v. SABBATINO
II. THE CONTEXT OF CONDITIONS
It is, of course, the claims and counterclaims as to the requirements
of authority which constitute in every case the specific controversy to
which decision makers must respond. The opposing claims asserted in
Banco Nacional regarding the legality of the seizure of C.A.V. are, there-
fore, of immediate concern to legal inquiry. Since the objectives sought
in this case, however, necessarily embrace all the characteristic demands
of formal and informal claimants seeking the protection and enhance-
ment of immediate and long term values in extensive foreign wealth
deprivations, 16 it is necessary to project the full factual context of Banco
Nacional if meaningful, authoritative international policy prescriptions
are to be discerned. In short, because international law contemplates the
reduction of tensions across State boundaries, it must reflect and be
responsive to the vicissitudes of all of the socio-economic and political
relationships which exist between States.
The global context within which Banco Nacional arose is character-
ized by an ever growing intensity of unsatisfied demand for wider eco-
nomic participation and reward. Although Cold War tensions fill the
daily headlines, this "revolution of rising expectations" may have greater
historical significance. Embracing the entire spectrum of human demand,
its impact has been and will continue to be pervasive.
While this revolution is today waged in all quarters,' 7 it is most
popularly associated with what Vera Micheles Dean has called "the land
of Bandungia"-Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.' s
With Mexican and Soviet reforms seen as inspirational precedents, the
clock of human endeavor is being pushed forward by centuries. Plagued
by poverty, antiquated institutions, political instability and a host of
16 By "foreign wealth deprivations" we mean State action against private alien
wealth over which States claim jurisdictional competence, totally or partially depriving
alien owners of title or control. This term is used to avoid the normative ambiguities
of the words "confiscation" and "expropriation," the former referring to deprivations
without the offer of compensation and the latter to deprivations accompanied by such
an offer. By "extensive" we refer to alien property seizures commonly referred to as
"nationalizations" or "socializations." The expression is employed because it is some-
times possible to characterize even nationalizations as limited deprivations-that is,
isolated takings of alien property amounting to an insignificant proportion of the ag-
gregate of foreign-owned wealth in the depriving State, typical of pre-1914 property
seizures. The diacritical line, of course, may be difficult to draw. For a more extensive
discussion, see Dawson and Weston, Prompt, Adequate and Effective: A Universal
Standard of Compensation?, 30 FoRDHAm L. REv. 727 (1962).
17 Thus, the so-called "Black Revolution," now altering traditional economic and
social patterns within the United States, whereby Negro citizens now agitate with
increasing vigor for basic human rights, demonstrates that the "revolution of rising
expectations" is not confined to nations euphemistically called "less developed" or
"underdeveloped."
18 DEAN, THE NATURE OF THE NON-WESTERN WORLD 13-16 (1957).
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other grievances, the governments of Bandungia today strive not only
to eradicate humiliating remnants of past political and economic sub-
servience, but also to adjust to an age of high mass consumption by
overcoming complex frustrations generated by the disintegration of
ancient ways.19 Often challenged by what might be called domestic poly-
centrism, 20 these nations must now find new forces of integration. Absent
progressive technologies, rapid rates of capital accumulation and strong
entrepreneurial classes required for an economic "spurt,"2' however, wide-
spread socio-economic reforms can be neither undertaken nor achieved
without the integrative influence of broad public participation in the
economic process. For, in addition to the fact that extensive State control
enables governments to enforce high levels of saving and investment, the
countries of Bandungia have no other institutions capable of mobilizing
internal and external capital and other resources. 22 Assumption of this
control often entails the seizure of foreign enterprises for motives which
19 Id. at 212-53. See also HEILBRONER, THE GREAT ASCENT (1963); HEILBRONER, THE
MAKING OF ECONOMIC SocIEry 198-221 (1962); MYRDAL, RICH LANDS AND POOR (1957);
STALEY, THE FUTURE OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1954).
20 The word "polycentrism" was coined several years ago by Italian Communist
Party leader Palmiro Togliatti to describe the comparatively recent diminution of
Soviet ideological influence and the proliferation of other centers of effective authority
and control within the Communist world. Although not yet noted by the lexi-
cographers, it has become an equally important reality in the West. We use the term
here to describe the many foci of political authority frequently found in the less
developed nations, resulting from such factors as geographic barriers and inadequate
communications, whose principal effect is to foster localism in outlook and personalism
in politics. For an excellent series of essays concerning polycentrism within the Com-
munist world, see 42 StRVEY, A JOURNAL OF SOVIET & EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES (1962).
For the effect of "polycentrism" in Latin America, see LiEUWEN, ARMS AND POLICS
IN LATIN AMERIcA (1960); TANNENBAUM, TEN KMYS TO LATIN AMERICA ch. 4 (1962).
21 By "economic spurt" we mean an acceleration in the rate of the industrial out-
put of less developed nations. We use the term in lieu of Professor Walter Rostow's
"take-off" which has engendered considerable theoretical debate, principally because
it focuses upon the historic economic development of today's industrially advanced
nations, not the economically backward. See RosTow, THE STAGES OF ECONoMIsc GROWTH
ch. 4 (1960).
22 This is especially true in Latin America where the State has been the traditional
initiator and supervisor of economic development, if only for the benefit of a select
few. In pre-Colombian times, economic activity was stringently controlled by theo-
cratic aboriginal States which did not recognize the concept of private property as
traditionally conceived in the West. After the Conquest, Spanish mercantilist philosophy
regulated colonial trade and manufacture through comprehensive, restrictive legisla-
tion. Upon independence, dictators and political oligarchies became the arbiters of
political endeavor in order to concentrate all wealth and power in their own hands.
This authoritarian centralized tradition largely inhibited development of a responsible
and significant group of middle-class entrepreneurs capable of acting as an independent
force in the national economy. See HEaRING, A HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA (1956);
RIPPY, LATIN AMERICA (1958); VON HAGEN, THE AZrEC: MAN AND TRIBE chs. 9, 34 (1958);
VON HAGEN, REALM OF THE INCAS chs. 8, 11 (1957).
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may be political and nationalistic23 as well as economic. 24 Hence the
"planned, large-scale taking of alien property has become today the
most publicized form of foreign wealth deprivation. Though once only
matters of limited concern, foreign wealth deprivations are today sub-
jects of national policy. '25
The events which gave genesis to Banco Nacional set no new prece-
dent.26 The dash of interests is given unusual intensity, however, by
the unique historic relationship between the United States and Latin
America in general, and the United States and Cuba in particular.
Although the United States was in 1821 the first non-Latin American
government to accord diplomatic recognition to the newly independent
Spanish colonies, United States policy in the next forty years, alternating
between political neglect and territorial aggrandizement, created among
Latin Americans a great reservoir of fear and distrust.27 American busi-
nessmen and politicians evinced new interest, however, both in Latin
American political stability (primarily in Mexico, Central America and
the Caribbean) and in inter-American trade and investment in the latter
23 Desires to eliminate foreign economic influence are not, as one commentator
correctly observes, confined to newly independent States. They also prevail in nations
which, like Iran or Cuba, have been at least nominally independent for years but have
only recently felt sufficiently powerful to challenge foreign interests. See WHITE, NA-
TIONALIZATION Or FOREIGN PROPERTY 24 (1961).
24 The oft-repeated argument that the seizure of alien property by less developed
nations produces only harmful economic effects is challenged in an excellent theo-
retical treatment by Bronfenbrenner, The Appeal of Confiscation in Economic De-
velopment, THE ECONOMICS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT 472-94 (ed. Aganvala and Singh
1958).
25 Dawson and Weston, supra note 16, at 731.
26 The Mexican Revolution of 1910, with its widespread nationalizations of alien-
owned lands, mineral deposits and oil refineries demonstrates the early arrival of the
"revolution of rising expectations" in Latin America. As Professor Kunz noted: "La
Revolucion Mexicana is the all embracing name for a vast social transformation, an
attempt to give to the masses, land, hygiene, education, to reshape the country com-
pletely, to create a new Mexican nation, to emancipate the Indian, who represents
*. . more than 90% of the population, and to liberate the peon through an economic
and spiritual higher standard of living." Kunz, The Mexican Expropriations, 17
N.Y.U.L. REv. 327, 328 (1940). Professor Tannenbaum has pointed out the substantial
inspirational influence of the Mexican Revolution upon Fidel Castro. TANNENBAUM,
op. cit. supra note 20, at 218-27.
27 Despite early Latin American overtures and the Monroe Doctrine notwithstand-
ing, the United States consistently refused to enter into political alliances with her
neighbors to the south. Indeed, this period was marked by the disastrous United States-
Mexican War, the depredations of American "filibusters" in the Caribbean and
Central America, and maneuvers by the United States and Great Britain to assure
joint exclusive control over any future Isthmian canal. See HERRING, op. cit. supra
note 22, at 320-25, 445-46, 484-86; PERKINS, THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMEICA,
45-54 (1961). See also generally STUART, LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES (5th ed.
1955).
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part of the nineteenth century.28 While some Latin Americans (largely
the ruling oligarchies) welcomed this development with favorable politi-
cal and economic concessions, others considered the United States a
brutish Caliban preying upon Latin America's more innocent and
spiritual Ariel.29 After 1900 the Roosevelt Corollary provided the theo-
retical justification for protecting strategic United States interests through
military intervention, especially in Central America and the Caribbean. 30
Accordingly, by the end of World War I, the United States was the
major foreign trader and investor in Latin America.31 Eventually recog-
nizing that this economic and political penetration had alienated many
Latin Americans, the United States, at the Seventh Pan American Con-
ference in Montevideo in 1933, adopted the principle of nonintervention
as the corner stone of a Good Neighbor Policy designed to restore con-
fidence in United States leadership at a time when war threatened
Europe.32 Since 1945, however, notwithstanding the good will of the
Thirties, United States-Latin American relations have been marked by
profound change. A new nationalism now sweeps Latin America. It
"insists upon the recognition of the importance of Latin America in
world affairs and is sometimes expressed in hostility to the foreign
entrepreneur and vigorous dislike of interference from outside."33 Today
there are widespread and vociferous demands for better health, housing
and education and for an end to stratified societies, monocultural export
economies and authoritarian rule.3 4 Not surprisingly, the United States,
28 Among the factors which inspired this new interest were the French invasion of
Mexico in the 1860s, revived American faith in republicanism, the opening of the
Panama Canal and the development of a strong industrial complex in the United
States which sought markets in Latin America for its new products. See HERRING, Op.
cit. supra note 22, at 318-20, 484-86; PERKINS, op. cit. supra note 27, at 64-86. See also
generally STUART, Op. cit. supra note 27.
29 In 1900, Uruguayan Jose Enrique Rodo thus characterized the United States in
a lengthy and widely read essay. The essay was influential throughout Latin America
and may be considered the basic gospel of "Yankeephobia." It was certainly the literary
predecessor of recent ex-President of Guatemala Juan Jos6 Ardvalo's THE SHARK AND
THE SARDINES (1961).
30 See for a brief but thorough presentation of American foreign policy in Latin
America at this time, THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 147-52 (ed. The American
Assembly 1959).
31 See for statistics, Senate Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs, United
States-Latin American Relations, Compilation of Studies, Study No. 4, S. Doc. No. 125,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 297-98 (1960).
32 See HERRING, op. cit. supra note 22, at 761-62.
33 PERKINS, op. cit. supra note 27, at 74.
34 See generally, ALEXANDER, TODAY'S LATIN AMERmcA (1962); BENTON, THE VOICE
OF LATIN AMERICA (1961); HIRSCHMAN, JOURNEYS TOWARD PROGRESS (1963); JOHNSON,
POLITICAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA: THE EMERGENCE OF THE MIDDLE SECTORS (1958);
LATIN AMERICA IssuEs, ESSAYS AND COMMENTS (ed. Hirschman, 1961); SOCIAL CHANGE IN
LATIN AMERICA TODAY (ed. Council on Foreign Relations 1960); SZULC, TWIIuGHT OF
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so long identified with the anciens regimes and so long the predominant
foreign participant in Latin American economic life, is often the prime
target of reformist zeal. 35 Since economic dependence is often inversely
proportionate to political independence, Latin American hostility is at
least understandable.
The ideals and aspirations of the Cuban Revolution epitomize the
social, political and economic upheaval now sweeping Latin America.
Cuba has always occupied a unique place in United States hemispheric
policy.3 6 Although freed from Spain in 1898, her newly acquired in-
dependence was only nominal. The bitterly resented Platt Amendment,
for example, asserted a United States prerogative to "preserve" Cuban
independence through intervention. Incorporated in the 1901 Cuban
Constitution, the amendment thus assured United States influence in
Cuban internal affairs.3 7 Similarly, a post-1900 influx of United States
capital resulted in virtual American domination of the Cuban economy.
By 1939, the highpoint of United States economic influence in Cuba,
American interests alone controlled about fifty-five per cent of total
Cuban sugar production.38 The sugar industry, in turn, so dominated
Cuban economic life that basic foodstuffs had to be imported with funds
derived from sugar sales to the United States. The entire island thus
became "enmeshed in a monetary economy dependent primarily upon
the export of sugar at a world market price over which Cuba [had] no
control." 39 Despite repeal of the odious Platt Amendment in 1933 and
the gradual decrease of foreign sugar holdings after 1939,40 "Yankee-
THE TYRANTS (1959); TANNENBAUM, op. cit. supra note 20; THE UNrrED STATES AND LATIN
AMERICA (ed. The American Assembly 1959).
35 The Latin American nations "want to carve a niche for themselves, a special
place where they will not only feel secure, but shine forth to the world as a unique
historic personality. That is why they are so bitter. That is why the memory of the
Platt Amendment rankles so and is seemingly unforgettable .... The little nations in
Latin America want only to be themselves, not tied to American apron strings or led
by the American hand. This is a matter about which we will hear much in the next
generation or two." TANNENBAUM, op. cit. supra note 20, at 214-15.
36 Since the time of Thomas Jefferson, various groups in the United States have
contemplated either the outright seizure or purchase of Cuba. See HERRING, op. Cit.
supra note 22, at 398-403; Rippy, op. cit. supra note 22, at 348-50.
37 "The argument over the Platt Amendment accounted to a large extent for the
exceptionally violent character of [recent] political strife in Cuba." INTL COMM'N or
JURISTS,, CUBA AND THE RULE OF LAW 26-27 (1962) [hereinafter cited as RULE oF LAW].
38 Id. at 13.
39 TANNENBAUM, op. Cit. Supra note 20, at 223.
40 By 1958, Cuban capital controlled 121 small mills representing 62.13% of total
Cuban sugar production. Canadian, British and Dutch owned mills had by this time
passed into Cuban hands. Of the 161 mills then operating, one, accounting for 0.27%
of total production, was French, three, accounting for 0.95% of total production, were
Spanish, and 36, accounting for 36.65% of total production, were American-owned. See
RULE OF LAw 13.
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phobia" persisted, largely because of the open support accorded Cuban
caudillo Fulgencio Batista by both official and private American repre-
sentatives. Given Batista's legacy of corruption and repression, the in-
itial acclaim accorded Fidel Castro and his antipathy to the United
States were to be expected. Promising true independence and the restora-
tion of dignity and integrity to Cuban public life, his regime "constitutes
so far the most determined effort to break up that community of political,
economic and cultural interests which has been fostered by Cuba's
physical proximity to the United States." 41
It is in this light that the acts and events which culminated in Cuba's
seizure of C.A.V. and other American enterprises must be appraised. For
it is clear that any significant Cuban reform necessarily required profound
disruption of past patterns, including the limitation of foreign economic
and political influence.42 As part of the worldwide "revolution of rising
expectations" and as a manifestation of historic Latin American resent-
ment against United States hegemony, it is perhaps inevitable that the
Cuban Revolution has resulted in fundamental assaults, justifiable and
otherwise, upon traditional Western notions about private property, in-
tensely represented by past American presence in Cuba. This complex
background, crystallized in Banco Nacional, must be given special
emphasis by our domestic courts if they are to play a positive role in the
international legal process and if fundamental community policies at
stake in the Law of State Responsibility are to be realistically discerned.
III. COMMUNITY POLICIES AT STAKE
Traditionally, the Law of State Responsibility has purported to ac-
commodate two distinct interests: the exclusive interest of each State in
exercising formal authority and effective control over all property within
its territorial competence, and the exclusive interest of the foreign in-
vestor in gaining access to any of the world's economic resources and in
being assured maximum security upon the achievement of that end. On
the one hand, States have long insisted upon the right to order and
structure their economies in unhampered freedom, whether through ex-
ercise of the power to deprive absolutely or through application of such
regulatory powers as the police power and the power to tax.43 Commonly
41 Id. at 9.
42 Jos6 Marti, acknowledged by Fidel Castro as the intellectual progenitor of the
26th of July Movement, was a Cuban patriot who helped lead the final revolt against
Spain in 1895. In his voluminous writings Marti stated that a nation dependent upon
a monocultural export economy would not long remain free. He therefore urged agri-
cultural diversification lest United States dominance of the sugar industry impair
Cuban political sovereignty. See Grey, Josd Marti and Social Revolution in Cuba, 5 J.
INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES 249, 253-54 (1963).
43 Regulatory techniques may be so employed, as to constitute "creeping expropria-
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honored by such symbols as "national sovereignty," "territorial jurisdic-
tion," "self-determination" and "nonintervention," the principle of ter-
ritorial jurisdiction remains today the most basic organizing principle
of world order. The exclusive competence of States, however, at least
where aliens are affected, is not unbridled. The concern of the interna-
tional investor for maximum access and security has thus found expres-
sion in such generalizations as "the doctrine of acquired rights," "the
inviolability of private property," "the principle of nondiscrimination,"
"the requirement of prompt, adequate and effective compensation" and
"the rule of public utility." These allegedly precise and often opposing
sets of claims have evolved through several centuries of international
jurisprudence. Essential to a present-day understanding of the Law of
State Responsibility, therefore, is an appreciation of both its theoretical
antecedents and the dichotomous nature of its development.
Its theoretical framework was conceived in a relatively static world of
culturally isolated European communities governed by personal sov-
ereigns at a time when "the law of nations" was considered part of "the
universal law of nature," reflecting general agreement upon an oscillat-
ing and evolving scale of moral and economic values. Whether it was
when men exorcized the specter of agrarian feudalism through appeals
to doctrines of natural right, or when men glorified their commercial
instincts through laissez faire notions of individual self-interest and
unfettered economic freedom, or when utilitarian and humanitarian
conceptions of private wealth ownership sought to alleviate the economic
and social maladjustments generated by the hum of the factory engine,
patterns of legal and economic expectation in the international com-
munity from the early Reformation to the mid-nineteenth century were
almost wholly European in character and almost wholly shared.44 Not
surprisingly, foreign property interests, such as there were, posed few
problems in the international affairs of this pre-industrial world.
The practical conditions which first gave rise to the operative de-
velopment of the Law of State Responsibility, on the other hand, largely
describe the world arena from about 1850 to World War 1.45 By and
tion" or "nibbling the foreign property owner to death." See RUBIN, PRIVATE FOREIGN
INVESTMFENT 43 (1956). The problem is not one of incompatibility between States' rights
to exclusive control over internal wealth processes and the property interests of aliens,
but one of economic adjustment and the establishment of a modus vivendi conducive
to the maximization of goal-values.
44 See CLOUGH & COLE, ECONOIc HISTORY OF EUROPE chs. 4, 6-8 (3d ed. 1952); DUNN,
THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS 45-53 (1932); ELLwORTH, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMlY
ch. 2 (Rev. ed. 1958); HEILBRONER, THE MAKING OF ECONOMIC SOCIETY 18-71 (1962).
For a brilliant analysis of the evolution of traditional theories of individual property
rights, see TAWNEY, THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY (1920).
45 See DUNN, op. cit. supra note 44, at 53-61.
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large, it was during this period that private foreign investment first as-
sumed truly international proportions.46 With the acceleration of in-
dustrialization, improvements in agricultural technology, faster means
of communication and increasing number and complexity of business
and financial techniques, European people, capital and predispositions,
to say nothing of goods, flowed as never before until the old mercantilist
structure was finally dismantled. Inevitably, the appearance of the
European trader and investor in sovereign foreign lands, notably in
politically independent but unstable Latin America, produced the con-
flicts which helped generate the prescriptions today subsumed under the
Law of State Responsibility.
The prescriptions which evolved, however, although of purported
impartiality, are demonstrably European in origin and bias. Principles
of common justice and fair dealing which had been forged in the simpler
pre-industrial era (e.g., notions of the sacredness of private property and
of absolute freedom of contract) were transmuted into accepted patterns
of expectation in the wider international community.47 Due in no small
measure to the enormous expansion of British overseas investments
backed by the largest empire and the most powerful fleet in the world,
these principles tended to favor the capitalist economy of nineteenth
century Europe. And as long as the international community was domi-
nated by a European system of capitalistic individualism, this bias per-
sisted. Beginning with the sweeping transformations of the Mexican
and Russian revolutions, the twentieth century offered the initial and
now constant challenge to these underlying values. The Cuban Revolu-
tion and Ba'nco Nacional have again brought these traditional conflicts
into sharp focus.
The challenge cannot be met, however, by such proposals as that of
the American Bar Association when commenting upon the reluctance
46 Of course, the earlier Age of Discovery and the period of colonization which
followed greatly expanded European horizons. Mercantilism marked national policy,
however, and this for the most part meant that private foreign investment was limited
to colonial territories in which mother countries exercised formal authority and/or
effective control over their own nationals.
47 See HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 59-60 (8th ed. 1924); KAPLAN &
KATZENBACH, op. cit. supra note 5, at 62-70. These expectations were reflected by the
end of the nineteenth century in ANZILOTTr, TEORIA GENERALE DELLA RESPONSABILITA-
DELLO STATO NEL Dmrrro INTERNAZIONALE (1902); HEILBORN, DAS SYSTEM DES V6LKER-
RECHTS ENTW ICKELT AUS DEN V6LKERRECHTLICHEN BEGRIFFEN (1896); TCHERNOFF, LE DROIT
DE PROTECTION EXERcE PAR UN ETAT A L'EGARD DE SES NATIONAUX RESIDANT A L'ETRANGER
(1898); TRIPEL, VOLKERRECHT OND LANDESRECHT (1899). See also BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC
PROTECTION OF CITIZENs ABROAD (1961), which demonstrated the extent to which the
Law of State Responsibility had become a unified body of doctrine within the Western
world.
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of the court of appeals to categorically impose a nineteenth century com-
pensation standard:
No consideration appears to have been given by the court to
the possibility of excluding foreign-owned property in such
"large-scale measures" so that questions of international respon-
sibility would not arise.48
Clearly, this solution is that of the proverbial ostrich. Nationalistic fervor
desires to eradicate remnants of colonial pasts, and pressures for socio-
economic and political reform cannot be so summarily dismissed and it
is preposterous to assume that developing nations can be persuaded by
such unrealistic proposals. The Bar Association might more profitably
have recognized that divergent methods of achieving fundamental goals
are not necessarily fatal to the future of foreign investment, but may,
when realistically evaluated, effectively promote security and abun-
dance.49
Nor is the task simplified by the proposals of some less developed na-
tions to exclude private foreign investment. There has been a disturbing
unqualified acceptance recently of the view that problems of social and
economic development can be resolved only by recourse to the public
sector. Those who would eliminate private capital entirely, however, like
those who deem private enterprise the sole panacea, are victims of a
doctrinaire approach to problems of economic development. Of course,
there is ample justification, as noted above, especially in the politically
sensitive economic sectors of underdeveloped countries, for wide public
participation in the infrastructure of national economies. 50 But balanced
48 REPORT BY THE CoITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT, SECTION
OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAw, ABA; THE PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
INVESTED ABROAD 10 (1963).
49 The variety of modalities used to obtain compensation in the twentieth century
is illustrative. Settlements have included the use of frozen assets, tying arrangements,
indemnification from the profits of the seized enterprise, barter agreements and the
like. See Aubert, Foreign Expropriations in Swiss Law, 6 Am. J. Coip. L. 577 (1957);
Dawson and Weston, supra note 16; Doman, Compensation for Nationalised Property
in Post-War Europe, 3 INT'L L.Q. 323 (1950); Drucker, The Nationalization of United
Nations Property in Europe, 36 TRANSACT. GROT. Soc'r 75 (1957); Farmanfarma, The
Oil Agreement Between Iran and the International Oil Consortium: The Law Con-
trolling, 34 TEXAs L. REv. 259 (1955); Rubin, Nationalization and Compensation: A
Comparative Approach, 17 U. Cm. L. REv. 458 (1950); Ujlaki, Compensation for the
Nationalization of American-Owned Property in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, 1
N.Y.L.F. 265 (1955). A more recent and interesting development occurred in Brazil,
whereby the Brazilian Government has agreed to provide deprived American tele-
phone companies with a high rate of compensation on the condition that they reinvest
the same in less politically sensitive sectors of the national economy. See N.Y. Times,
April 13, 1962, p. 1, col. 4 (late city ed.); Wall Street Journal, February 1, 1963, p. 4,
col. 3 (Midwest ed.).
50 Thus, nations may not wish to have their communication, transportation and
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economic growth will not be attained without encouraging private as
well as public participation in the economic superstructure of a nation,51
if only because public funds are not sufficient to meet these needs.52 In
addition, private capital can help offset the diversion of limited technical
funds and know-how from priority development programs. It can con-
tribute substantially to the growth of individual technological and
administrative skills. It can foster new markets for related infant in-
dustries. And, given wise administration, private capital can assure eco-
nomically efficient enterprises central to the national well being.
Recognizing the need for both socio-economic reform and private for-
eign investment, therefore, it should be clear that what is at stake apropos
the Law of State Responsibility is the freedom of economic initiative, ex-
periment and diversity on the one hand, and the assurance of economic
security, stability and cooperation on the other. In the most abstract
sense, the viability of the Law of State Responsibility itself is at stake.
For the strength of any legal system, especially one characterized by the
absence of an effective supranational regulatory authority and marked
by the lawless threat of nuclear destruction, necessarily depends upon the
extent to which the common interest of all its participants in assuring
the peaceful shaping and sharing of the world's economic resources is
kept at the forefront of the decision making process.
This common interest, which may be defined generally as the establish-
ment and maintenance of an appropriate balance between the exclusive
interests of individual States, is dependent upon the effectiveness of and
respect for the Law of State Responsibility. In this revolutionary era,
however, effectiveness and respect themselves depend in turn upon a
creative, equitable and efficient balance between demands for both socio-
economic reform and private profit. Because of complex contemporary
interdependencies, that balance will be creative only to the extent that
the economic goal-values of each nation can be maximized without un-
other public utilities controlled or owned by aliens. Similarly, as took place in Mexico
in the 1920-30s, basic natural resources are often regarded as properly subject to State
control in the interest of national security. In this connection, see Bronfenbrenner,
supra note 24. For a comprehensive treatment of the Mexican nationalizations see
Kunz, The Mexican Expropriations, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. 327 (1940).
51 This includes areas of manufacture, supply and distribution in which aliens
from wealthier nations may have more technical skill and experience. Discussions of
this thesis may be found in such recent commentaries as BAUER & YAMEY, THE ECO-
NOMICS OF UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 142-45 (1957); MASON, ECONOMIC PLANNING:
GOVERNMENT AND BUSINEss IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1958); TiMBERG, THE SHAPING
OF THE WORLD ECONOMY ch. 7 (1962); The United Nations Development Decade, U.N.
Doc. No. E/3613, ch. 6 (1962); Collado, Economic Development Through Private
Enterprise, 41 FOR. Arr. 708 (1963); Gardner, International Measures for the Promo-
tion and Protection of Foreign Investment, 9 J. Pun. L. 176 (1960).
52 See Gardner, supra note 51, at 178; Collado, supra note 51, at 714.
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duly thwarting the economic aspirations of others. It will be equitable
only insofar as it can preserve freedom from arbitrary decisions based
upon exclusive national and cultural preferences. And it will be efficient
only to the degree that it can secure a minimum waste of investment in
time, energy and resource. It is the establishment and maintenance of
this balance which restricts exclusive claims to the minimum reasonably
necessary to secure the special interests asserted and which promotes to
the highest possible degree the inclusive interest of the entire world
community in maintaining and encouraging a constant and productive
flow of wealth across State boundaries. As eloquently stated by a past
president of the American Society of International Law:
The most rational alternative open to peoples who genuinely
project a world public order of human dignity would accord-
ingly appear to be, not futilely to attempt to repel the advance
of more inclusive decision, but rather to continue to seek that
balance between the inclusive competence of the general com-
munity of states and the exclusive competence of particular
states most economically designed to further their long-term
basic goal values. 53
In short, it is the establishment and maintenance of this balance which
is in the common interest of all peoples everywhere and which therefore
must be the prime policy consideration applied to the familiar decision
making task of securing an accommodation and reconciliation of con-
flicting claims arising under the Law of State Responsibility. It cannot
be applied without intelligence, impartiality and creative imagination.
IV. THE OUTCOME OF DECISION APPRAISED
We have attempted to identify the claimants and their objectives, to
explore the context within which Banco Nacional arose and to project
the fundamental community policies which are at stake. We turn next
to the decisions themselves.
In the months preceding the district court decision, United States-
Cuban relations steadily deteriorated. Among the disruptive events were
the summary proceedings of the Cuban revolutionary courts, the passage
of Cuba's agrarian and urban reform laws, the visit to Havana of Soviet
Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan, the suspension of the Cuban sugar
quota, the seizure of American and other foreign enterprises and the
abrupt dismissal of members of the Cuban judiciary. On January 3,
1961, the United States severed diplomatic and consular relations. Nearly
four months later, on March 31, after further recriminatory exchange be-
S3 MCDOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 233 (1960).
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tween the two nations and the formation in Florida of the exile Revolu-
tionary Council, the district court rendered its decision.
Between the time of this decision and that of the court of appeals on
July 6, 1962, tensions heightened. It was during this period that Cuban
exiles, with United States support, mounted the abortive Bay of Pigs
invasion. In addition, Cuba was proclaimed a socialist state, popular
elections were rejected, private educational facilities were nationalized,
Premier Castro proclaimed himself a Marxist-Leninist, the O.A.S. ex-
pelled Cuba from membership, the United States imposed a trade em-
bargo and Soviet military and economic aid poured into the island.
It is against this immediate setting54 and the general context within
which Banco Nacional arose that both decisions must be assessed. No
decision can be realistically appraised without exposing all of the factors
which, acknowledged or not, necessarily condition its outcome.
While the district court held that it was not free "to refuse enforce-
ment to the nationalization decree because it violates the public policy
of the forum,"'55 the court ruled that it could examine the international
validity of Law No. 851 pursuant to which C.A.V. was nationalized, the
Act of State Doctrine notwithstanding. If Cuba had violated interna-
tional law, the court reasoned, her agent, Banco Nacional, would have
no title to the sugar proceeds in question. After so finding, the court
dismissed Banco Nacional's complaint. The decision was based on the
following: (1) The seizure of C.A.V. "was not reasonably related to a
public purpose"; 56 (2) the nationalization measure was of a "discrimina-
tory nature"; 57 and (3) the nationalization decree "[did] not provide ade-
quate compensation for the taking of the properties."58
Upholding the district court's refusal to invoke the Act of State Doc-
trine, the court of appeals declined "to attempt a resolution of [the]
difficult question" of "whether a government's failure, in and of itself,
to pay adequate compensation for the property it takes is a breach of
international responsibility." 59 Nevertheless, this court found Cuba in
breach of international law because
the Cuban decree of expropriation not only failed to provide
adequate compensation but also involved a retaliatory purpose
and a discrimination against United States nationals .... 60
54 See generally, RULE OF LAW, op. cit. supra note 37, at 5-7; Reeves, The Cuban
Situation: The Political and Economic Relations of the United States and Cuba, 17
Bus. LAv. 980 (1962); N.Y. Times, March 1, 1959 through July 6, 1962.
55 193 F. Supp. at 379-80.
56 Id. at 384.
57 Id. at 385.
58 Ibid.
59 307 F.2d at 864.
60 Id. at 868.
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Accordingly, the court of appeals ruled that Banco Nacional had no
claim to the proceeds held in receivership and affirmed dismissal of the
complaint.
A careful analysis of these opinions reveals that both tend to ob-
fuscate, rather than clarify, the function and requirements of the Law
of State Responsibility. If left unappraised, they may seriously mislead
both future claimants and decision makers who seek in them those
predictable guidelines for future decision which assure that stability of
economic expectation vital to international investors and developing
nations alike.
A. The Claim of Public Utility
Traditional doctrine insists that the private property of aliens may
be taken only for a public purpose.61 Absent such purpose, it is said, a
foreign wealth deprivation violates international law.6 2
The district court unequivocally embraced this orthodox "rule." Thus,
Judge Dimock held:
The taking was avowedly in retaliation for acts by the Gov-
ernment of the United States, and was totally unconnected with
the subsequent use of the property being nationalized. This
fact alone is sufficient to render the taking violative of interna-
tional law.63
The court of appeals, however, declined to apply the public utility
doctrine with such finality. Unwilling to concede that absence of a public
purpose alone constitutes a violation of international law, the court
found that "confiscation without compensation when the expropriation
is an act of reprisal [i.e., not of public utility] does not have significant
support among disinterested international law commentators from any
country" 64 to merit legal validity. It followed, therefore, that Cuba had
committed a "prima facie breach of international law" because "peace-
time seizure of the property of nationals of a particular country, as an
act of reprisal against that country, appears to this court to be contrary
61 The terms "public utility," "public benefit" and "public necessity" have also
been used. The United Nations has given the concept a wide and general interpreta-
tion in Paragraph I (4) of its Resolution 1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty Over
Natural Wealth and Resources: "Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall
be based on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest
which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic
and foreign." Quoted in 18 N.Y.C. BAR Ass'N RcoRD 377, 395 (1963).
62 See White, op. cit. supra note 23, at 5-6, 145-50; WORTLEY, EXPROPRIArTION IN
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 115-16 (1959); Cheng, Expropriation In International Law,
21 SOL. 98, 99 (1954); McNair, The Seizure of Property and Enterprises in Indonesia, 6
NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REv. 218, 243 (1959).
63 193 F. Supp. at 384-85.
64 307 F.2d at 866.
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to generally accepted principles of morality throughout the world." 65
The court thus linked public utility to the principle of compensation.
In support of the court's finding, however, Judge Waterman quoted the
identical language cited by the district court for the "rule" of public
utility.66 Inferentially, if not expressly, therefore, the court of appeals
perpetuated this orthodoxy.
The doctrine of public utility is not new. Early declared by Grotius
to be one of several limitations upon a sovereign's right of eminent do-
main, 67 the doctrine was incorporated into the legal systems of all of the
major eighteenth and nineteenth century powers in order to protect
against domestic executive and legislative abuse of private property
rights.66 Some countries, significantly the United States, have since inter-
preted this essentially domestic legal concept as an independent "rule"
of customary international law for determining the legality of foreign
wealth deprivations. 69
Notwithstanding the positions of the district court and the court of
appeals-positions, incidentally, which largely reflect United States Gov-
ernment policy preferencesT0-it is today clear that the "rule" of public
utility is of little or no value for the Law of State Responsibility. Not
only may its authoritativeness be questioned, but it is ambiguous in
definition and nonfunctional in practice. Even its proponents question
its practical effectiveness. 71
65 Ibid.
66 Compare 307 F.2d at 866, with 193 F. Supp. at 384, n.22.
67 GROTTIS, ON THE RIGHTs OF WAR AND PEACE 179 (Whewell transl. 1853). Pufendorf
also upheld this view but failed to define the abstraction beyond pointing out that the
"necessity" which would justify a taking need not always be considered in the sense
of "emergency." DROIT DE LA NATURE ET DES GENs 1286 [Classics of International Law
ed. 1954].
68 See WHITE, NATIONALISATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 146 (1961).
69 This development has been exemplified by United States efforts to include a
"public purpose" clause in treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation. See WILSON,
UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 120-21 (1960); Walker,
Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present United
States Practice, 5 Am. J. CoMP. L. 229 (1956). Metzger, however, has stated that the
public purpose doctrine is not "an international law requirement." Metzger, Multi-
lateral Conventions for the Protection of Private Foreign Investments, 9 J. PuB. L. 133,
140 (1960).
70 In 1938, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, in a Note to the Mexican Ambassador,
acknowledged the "sovereign right of any government to expropriate private property
within its borders in furtherance of public purposes [provided compensation is paid]."
Quoted in BRIGGS, THE LAw oF NATIONS 556 (2d ed. 1952). More recently, in its Note
of July 16, 1960 to the Cuban government, the United States severely criticized Cuban
Law No. 851 as retaliatory and, hence, unrelated to a public purpose. 43 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 171 (1960).
71 Thus, RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 190, com-
ment b (Proposed Official Draft, 1962), states: "Although the requirement of a public
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What constitutes a "public purpose" in customary international law?
The conspicuous paucity of precise scholarly comment on this question
is undoubtedly due in great measure to the normative ambiguity of the
concept. Rarely discussed by international tribunals, 72 it is most fre-
quently invoked by domestic courts adjudicating claims to the so-called
"police power" and the power of "eminent domain" in cases involving
local property deprivations.73 As might be expected, the concept is thus
defined less with regard to the diverse expectations of the world com-
munity than in terms of the perspectives of Western decision makers7 4 -
their value preferences, their identifications and their expectations of
future events-easily traced to eighteenth and nineteenth century capi-
talistic utilitarian notions of private property.
Perhaps it is not surprising, therefore, that despite the wording of
Paragraph Third of Cuban Executive Power Resolution No. 1 (which
declared that "these compulsory expropriations are carried out for the
reasons of public necessity and national interest.....75), the district
court concluded:
The taking of the property was not justified by Cuba on the
ground that the state required the property for some legitimate
purpose or that transfer of ownership of the property was neces-
sary for the security, defense or social good of the state.76
Although not subscribing to the traditional "rule" of public utility, the
purpose is frequently referred to in international jurisprudence, as well as in the
constitutions of many states, there is little authority in international law establishing
any useful criteria by which a state's own determination of public purpose can be
questioned." To similar effect, see Domke, Foreign Nationalizations: Some Aspects of
Contemporary International Law, 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 585, 590-91 (1961); Sohn & Baxter,
Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens, 55 Am. J. INT'L
L. 545, 555 (1961) (comment on Draft Convention on the International Responsibility
of States for Injuries to Aliens).
72 In the Walter Fletcher Smith Claim (United States/Cuba), 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb.
Awards 913 (1929), the arbitrator found that "the expropriation proceedings were
not, in good faith, for the purpose of public utility." To the same effect, see Oscar
Chinn Case, P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 63, at 75 (1934); El Triunfo Case (United States/El
Salvador), For. Rel. of U.S. 888 (1902); The Savage Claim (United States/El Salvador),
2 MOORE, ARBITRATIONS 1865 (1893). In none of these cases was the concept explored.
Moreover, none turned on the lack of "public utility" alone.
73 The experience of our own courts is illustrative. See MCDOUGAL & HABER, PROP-
ERTY, WEALTH, LAND: ALLOCATION, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT 83-94 (1948); CRIBBET,
FRrrz & JOHNSON, CASES ON PROPERTY 1065-1118 (1960).
74 It is submitted that, notwithstanding European influence in the nineteenth cen-
tury, Latin American perspectives may be considered non-Westem. E.g., DEAN, THE
NATURE OF THE NON-WESTERN WORLD (1957).
75 193 F. Supp. at 383, n.14.
76 Id. at 384. While willing to search for evidence of "retaliation" in the language
of the decree, Judge Dimock was apparently indisposed to acknowledge an express
assertion of public purpose.
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court of appeals, like the court below, found no public purpose in the
taking.77 It found, instead, a "retaliatory purpose."
In erroneously posing retaliation as the antithesis of public purpose,
both courts unnecessarily confused an already ambiguous abstraction.
While a retaliatory seizure may in fact be undertaken for purely private
and selfish motives, there is no inevitable nexus between the two notions;
presence of retaliation need not mean absence of public purpose. It is
wholly possible, even given a retaliatory motive, that property may also
be taken "for the security, defense or social good of the state."78 An
impartial appraisal of the factual context of Banco Nacional makes this
clear. Moreover, had the Cuban seizure not been retaliatory, either
avowedly or in fact, would the courts still have found no public purpose?
Given an otherwise identical set of facts, we think this hardly possible.
Perhaps the presence or absence of retaliation may help determine
whether or not a seizure is discriminatory,79 but we fail to see its relevance
in determining the existence or nonexistence of a public purpose. Any
operative conjunction between the two concepts is entirely fortuitous.
With all due respect it is submitted that national and cultural identifica-
tions placed a disproportionate premium upon the "rule." The district
court's neglect of Paragraph Third thus produced what one commentator
has called a decision which "artificially denies a public purpose because
the particular expropriation was decreed as a response to the American
cut in the Cuban sugar quota."s 0 For its part, the court of appeals would
have been far wiser to abandon the doctrine of public utility altogether,
rather than further press compliance with its inherently subjective
presumptions.
Moreover, the "rule" of public utility today serves little function in
clarifying complex issues and available policy alternatives. Given a
modicum of authentic information about the revolutionary world in
which we live, the incompatibility of this norm with the context of
Banco Nacional is dear. Where the "rule" may once have had authorita-
tive value, as in pre-1914 limited foreign wealth deprivations, today the
entrance of government into the once exclusive preserves of private
enterprise and its assumption of greater responsibility for individual
welfare renders the public purpose doctrine meaningless, if not obsolete.
77 307 F.2d at 868.
78 Indeed, it is arguable that the public purpose of the measure is intensified since
States do not retaliate without deeming their national security or interest at stake.
79 Section 205 of the RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 71, links retaliation with
discrimination. This questionable relation is discussed infra, at p. 91.
S0 Falk, Toward a Theory of the Participation of Domestic Courts in the Interna-
tional Legal Order: A Critique of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 16 Rtrrcas
L. REv. 1, 38 (1961).
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A realistic analysis of contemporary extensive foreign wealth deprivations
makes clear that such seizures are prima facie acts of public utility, de-
signed to play a substantial role in changing the character of societies
the world over. Indeed, the very definition and derivation of such words
and expressions as "socialization," "nationalization" or "the redistribu-
tion of wealth" (each of which describe the events which have occurred
in Cuba) presume a public purpose. As Gillian White has noted:
The classic notion of expropriation for public utility purposes
is only meaningful in the context of a legal system which is
based on respect for private property .... Such a context is no
longer common to all the members of the international society,
and in these circumstances it is doubted whether the retention
of the public utility principle would serve much purpose either
in the clarification of the complex issues raised by the na-
tionalisation of alien property, or in preventing the occurrence
of disputes over such measures.81
Moreover, the nonfunctional character of the "rule" of public utility
becomes obvious when projected against the goals of a viable Law of
State Responsibility. It is significant that, to our best knowledge, no
compensation has ever been awarded where absence of a public purpose
has alone been the determinant of illegality.8 2 The existence of the "rule"
offers scant assistance to the alien investor seeking reparation for his loss.
It makes little financial difference to investors whether their property is
seized for reasons of public utility or for any other purpose. Of course,
it can be argued that the concept should be preserved to justify punitive
damages as a deterrent to State action. International decision makers,
however, have traditionally been reluctant to grant such damages, or at
least to so label them.8 3 To invoke a theory of punitive damages to
justify retention of the "rule" of public utility flaunts contemporary
convictions about national sovereignty and, in effect, denigrates the
legitimate right of States to order and structure their economies as they
see fit. This is especially futile in extensive foreign wealth deprivations
where high degrees of national sensibility are involved. Traditionally
conceived, compensatory damages would seem sufficient to meet deterrent
demands.
It may be questioned, therefore, whether the "rule" of public utility,
81 WHrrE, op. cit. supra note 68, at 149.
82 See id. at 150.
83 Punitive damages are awarded most often in cases involving outrageous denials
of procedural justice or in international delicts of a quasi-criminal nature. Moreover,
since all international damage awards stem from notions of both reparation and
deterrence, it is difficult, if not impossible, to isolate one fiction of damages from
another. This observation is discussed in DUNN, op. cit. supra note 44, at 172-87.
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as invoked and applied by the district court and the court of appeals, is
consistent with the commonplace observation of a world of diverse
public orders and whether it is, in fact, adequate to meet contemporary
needs. The courts would have better served the cause of the Law of
State Responsibility had they directly attacked its inherent ambiguity and
non-functionality. Continued exhortations about the "rule" serve only
to raise and frustrate unwarranted expectations. The "rule" does nothing
to restrict exclusive claims to the minimum reasonably necessary to
secure the special interests asserted and to promote to the highest possible
degree the inclusive interest of all States in encouraging a constant and
productive flow of wealth across State boundaries. Its principal effect
is to impose eighteenth and nineteenth century European cultural
preferences upon what Professor Falk has called questions of "legitimate
diversity" between existing public orders8 4 and to divert the focus of
responsible attention from fundamental community policies.8 5 The
district court and he court of appeals thus improperly relied upon the
"rule" of public utility in dismissing plaintiff-appellant's complaint.
B. The Claim of Nondiscrimination
Commentary and practice provide abundant evidence that a State
may not discriminate against the person or property of an alien without
violating international law.8 6 Both courts reaffirmed this "rule" in Banco
Nacional.
Traditionally, nondiscrimination in international law means that
aliens must be assured at least the same, if not better, protection as
municipal law confers upon the nationals of a foreign State.sT As implied,
there are two schools of thought. Proponents of the "standard of equal [i.e.,
national] treatment" insist that customary international law "does not...
recognize the right to claim for the foreigner more favourable treatment
than is accorded to nationals."88 Advocates of the heretofore more widely
accepted "minimum [i.e., international] standard of justice," however,
84 Falk, supra note 80, at 34-35.
85 At least one commentator, while disapproving of a "rule" of public utility, be-
lieves that the concept may be useful in defining nationalization "and in distinguishing
it from other forms of State interference with private property such as penal confisca-
tion or acquisition for purposes of security and defence." WHrrE, op. cit. supra note 68,
at 148.
86 The principle was early enunciated by Vattel in 1765. VATrEL, THE LAw oF
NATIONS 165 (ed. 1872). Recent widespread demands for civil and other human rights,
in the United Nations and elsewhere, are testimony to the continued vitality of this
principle.
87 See WHrrE, op. cit. supra note 68, at 119.
88 Guerrero, Report on the Responsibility of States for Damage Done in Their Ter-
ritories to the Person or Property of Foreigners, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. Supi. 176, 182
(1926).
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demand more. The treatment due aliens, they contend, is wholly in-
dependent of the treatment given nationals.89 Under either standard,
however, it is dear that the difference in the actual treatment accorded
aliens and nationals, not the motives which precipitate State acts, is the
determinant of discrimination. As stated by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the Oscar Chinn Case (1934):
The form of discrimination which is forbidden is... discrimina-
tion based upon nationality and involving differential treatment
by reason of their nationality as between persons belonging to
different national groups.90
This point must be remembered when analyzing Banco Nacional.
The district court responded to the seizure of G.A.V. as follows:
[T]he present nationalization measure is contrary to the
standards of international law because of its discriminatory
nature. The act [Law No. 851] classifies United States nationals
separately from all other nationals, and provides no reasonable
basis for such a classification. The decree does not justify the
classification on the basis of the conduct of the owners in
managing and exploiting their properties or on the basis of their
importance to the security of the state where ownership of the
property resides. The justification is simply reprisal against
another government.9 '
89 The most frequently cited expression of the international standard of justice is
that of former Secretary of State Elihu Root: "There is a standard of justice, very
simple, very fundamental, and of such general acceptance by all civilized countries
as to form a part of the international law of the world. The condition upon which
any country is entitled to measure the justice due from it to an alien by the justice
which it accords to its citizens is that its system of law and administration shall con-
form to this general standard. If any country's system of law and administration does
not conform to that standard, although the people of the country may be content
or compelled to live under it, no other country can be compelled to accept it as fur-
nishing a satisfactory measure of treatment to its citizens." The Basis of Protection to
Citizens Residing Abroad, 4 PROCEEDINGs Aru. SOC'Y INT'L L. 16, 21 (1910).
90 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 63, at 87 (1934). (Emphasis added.) See also British Claims
in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 615, 647 (1923) (Au-
thor's transl.), in which the arbitrator stated: "It can be considered settled that in
International Law a foreigner may not be deprived of his property without fair in-
demnity, subject, of course, to any treaties in force; that is especially true when
restriction of property rights is the result of a measure directed against certain in-
dividuals and not against all owners similarly situated." See also the Case of the
Norwegian Claims Against the United States, I U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 307, 339
(1922), in which the arbitral tribunal invoked the principle against the United States,
as follows: "The United States are responsible for having thus made a discriminating
use of the power of eminent domain towards citizens of a friendly nation, and they
are liable for the damaging action of their officials and agents towards these citizens
of the Kingdom of Norway."
91 193 F. Supp. at 385. (Emphasis added.)
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Reasoning that United States nationals were expressly singled out
for solely retaliatory purposes, 92 the district court found discrimination
not because of differences in treatment between United States and Cuban
citizens, but because of the motive of the legislation in question. The
court neglected to inquire whether Law No. 851 and Law No. 890
(pursuant to which Cuban-owned sugar enterprises were nationalized
on October 13, 1960),93 might have revealed differences in treatment be-
tween domestic and alien sugar companies. Indeed, unlike the court of
appeals, Judge Dimock failed even to acknowledge the existence of Law
No. 890 or any other Cuban nationalization measure. The sine qua non
of the "rule" of nondiscrimination, however, is treatment, not motive.
This reliance upon motive rather than treatment is underscored by the
court's concluding statement on this matter:
Doubtless the measures which states may employ in their rival-
ries are of great variety but they do not include the taking of
the property of the nationals of the rival government. 94
The essence of the court's holding, therefore, was that Cuba had retaliated
and hence had discriminated.
While the circuit court explored more fully defendants' claim of non-
discrimination, it also failed to disentangle the concept of retaliation
from the doctrine of nondiscrimination. Judge Waterman began by
noting that Law No. 851 and Executive Power Resolution No. 1 "would
appear to be discriminatory, since retaliation against a person's homeland
is not a reasonable basis for a distinction in treatment." 95 The court
then sought to meet Banco Nacional's defense: That the seizure was
not discriminatory because it arose as part of Cuba's general policy "to
establish socialism" by "nationalization of industrial and agricultural
enterprises of size" through such measures as the Agrarian Reform
Law and the Urban Reform Law.96 The court of appeals denied any
relevant relation between Law No. 851 on the one hand and the
agrarian and urban reform laws on the other under which, the court
itself noted, "all large land holdings and multi-family dwellings were
nationalized."9 7 The court's sole explanation was that
these latter two pieces of legislation are of little relevance to the
92 It is possible, of course, that the specific naming of a group of aliens may only
be for the purpose of identifying the property to be taken by a particular decree. We
do not suggest that this was the case, however, in the Cuban legislation.
93 This relationship was noted, however, by the court of appeals at 307 F.2d at 866.
94 193 F. Supp. at 385.
95 307 F.2d at 866.
96 Brief for Appellant, p. 24, Banco Nacional, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
97 307 F.2d at 867. (Emphasis added.) The laws affected aliens and nationals alike.
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present case because of the substantial differences, in both policy
and effect, between the nationalization of real estate as such and
the nationalization of the means of production as such. 9
8
We fail to discern, however, these alleged "substantial differences" in
either policy or effect if only because respectable opinion has seen fit to
classify real estate within the economic concept of the means of produc-
tion.9 9 The court might have more rationally maintained the irrelevancy
of the agrarian and urban reform laws by noting that some authorities
restrict the concept of discrimination to persons and properties "similarly
situated."' 00 Even such a solution would have been unsatisfactory, how-
ever, because the nationalization of particular industries, as in Cuba,
often occurs not in isolation but as part of comprehensive programs
asserting State control over all sources of production, distribution and
supply.
Nevertheless, the circuit court did concede a relationship between
the seizure of Cuban-owned sugar enterprises on October 13, 1960, and
the seizure of C.A.V. and twenty-five other American-owned sugar com-
panies on August 6, 1960. The court stated that
if the ultimate effect of all the expropriations by the Castro
Cuban government was to treat Cuban-owned enterprises and
American-owned enterprises exactly alike, it would be difficult
for this court to find discrimination against American nationals.
And, perhaps, international law is not violated when equal treat-
ment is accorded aliens and natives, regardless of the quality of
treatment or the motives behind that treatment. 101
Presumably not opposing the widely accepted "minimum standard of
justice," the court nevertheless chose to evaluate defendants' claim of
nondiscrimination by recourse to the "standard of equal treatment,"
traditionally favored by Latin American legal scholars. 102 It was therefore
98 Ibid.
99 See, e.g., HEILBRONER, THE MAKING OF ECONOMIC SocIETY 63 (1962).
100 See British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb.
Awards 615 (1923); McNair, supra note 62, at 247.
101 307 F.2d at 867. (Emphasis added.)
102 The Calvo Doctrine, it may be said, is one of the historical antecedents of the
standard of equal treatment. In order to limit the scope of diplomatic intervention
on behalf of injured nationals in Latin America, the Calvo Doctrine, developed in the
late nineteenth century, proposed "that foreigners were entitled to the same kind of
treatment as natives but no better, and that, so long as local institutions of justice were
open to them on the same basis as to natives, there could be no basis of an interna-
tional complaint." DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS 56 (1932). First formulated
by the Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo, the doctrine was incorporated into treaties and
contracts to secure alien observance of Latin American local remedies. See BoRCHARD,
THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CrrIZNs ABROAD 792 (1961). For an analysis of the
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incumbent upon the court to determine whether the treatment of C.A.V.
was the same as that accorded Cuban nationals.
The court found a difference and, hence, inequality in treatment
because of the lapse of ten weeks between the nationalization of G.A.V.
on August 6, 1960, and the seizure of Cuban-owned sugar enterprises
on October 13, 1960. Accordingly, the court ruled that "the Cuban
government discriminated against United States nationals."' 03 The
alleged inequality, however, is not made clear. Ostensibly, the difference
was one of timing. Thus, admitting that "a short lapse of time between
similar provisions in the same program, standing alone, would not
create discrimination," the court nevertheless insisted that "the dif-
ference in time here is quite significant."'104 But what is "quite significant"
about a ten week time differential? The court might have argued that
the time gap would have given Cuban nationals sufficient notice to ap-
praise their inventories and liquidate their assets. Indeed, this is the
only meaningful argument, since we see no other reason to conclude
that merely because an alien's property is taken at one moment, the
treatment he receives will inevitably differ from the treatment accorded
a national whose property is taken ten weeks later. Yet not even this
argument was mentioned. Rather, the court found inequality of treat-
ment merely because "this difference in ten weeks' time stems directly
from the efforts of the Cuban government to retaliate against the United
States and its sugar-buying policy."'01 5 The answer is a non sequitur. Its
only possible rational interpretation is that the seizure of C.A.V. on
August 6 was simply in response to United States policy, whereas the
taking of Cuban-owned sugar enterprises on October 13 was not. This
seems dear in view of the court's statement that
since we have held above that seizure of the assets of nationals
of an unfriendly sovereign as part of a scheme of reprisal against
that country is illegal under international law, it follows that a
difference in treatment accorded those nationals based upon
reprisal is discriminatory.10 6
If this interpretation is accurate, then the difference in treatment was
not, in fact, one of timing. The timing argument, in short, becomes mere
window dressing for the rationale that retaliation is, in and of itself,
discriminatory. In fact, therefore, the court found not a difference in
treatment, but a difference in motive. This, according to the court's own
several manifestations of the doctrine, see Lipstein, The Place of the Calvo Clause in
International Law, 1945 BRrr. YB. INT'L L. 130.
103 307 F.2d at 867.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
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interpretation of the standard of equal treatment, may not be a violation
of international law at all. 0 7
Thus, both courts were in agreement: Reprisal against a State through
seizure of the property of that State's nationals is ipso facto discrimi-
natory.
It does not follow, however, that differences in treatment necessarily
flow from even unlawful reprisals. The concepts of discrimination and
retaliation, like those of public utility and retaliation, lack imperative
relationship. As noted, discrimination conceptually involves differences
in treatment, whereas reprisals connote distinctions in motive. Since the
legal and economic rights and interests of the claimants in Banco
Nacional were largely determined by this thinking, and because of the
potential effect of these findings upon the future trend of decision,
further analysis is required. Accordingly, two basic questions must be
answered: (1) Cuba's avowed reprisal aside, could the courts have found
discrimination against United States nationals under the "rule" of
nondiscrimination? (2) If not, could the courts have found a breach of
international law because of Cuba's avowed retaliation, in and of itself,
under the doctrine of reprisals?
As Judge Waterman suggested, if the ultimate treatment accorded
United States nationals by all the Cuban nationalization measures was
not, in fact, different from that accorded Cuban citizens, notwithstanding
that American properties were seized for avowedly different motives,
there may have been no discrimination. Apart from its perplexing
timing argument, however, the circuit court made no attempt to
elaborate meaningful differences in treatment between American and
Cuban sugar interests pursuant to Law No. 851 and Law No. 890, re-
spectively; e.g., differences in compensation or procedural justice. Indeed,
had either court appraised the full factual context of Banco Nacional
they might have found no discrimination at all.
It is commonplace that in many if not most contemporary nationaliza-
tions, the wealth taken is often substantially or entirely owned or con-
trolled by aliens.'0 8 Hence, on August 6, 1960, nine of the ten and
seventeen of the twenty largest sugar mills in Cuba were American-
owned or controlled. The remaining privately-owned Cuban mills
represented but a small proportion of this industrial sector.109 On these
107 See note 101 supra.
108 This phenomenon may be attributed to the fact that most contemporary ex-
tensive foreign wealth deprivations are undertaken by the less developed nations of
the world which for many years were subjected to intensive Western economic ex-
pansion and political penetration.
109 See FARR &- Co., MANUAL OV SUGAR COMPANIES 1949-50 (1950). See also Villarejo,
American Investment in Cuba, Nzw UNrERsrry THouGHT 79-81 (Spring 1960).
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facts alone, it is arguable that there might have been no discrimination
since as foreign ownership increases the likelihood of having aliens
and nationals "similarly situated" between whom differences in treat-
ment can be found decreases proportionately.11° Thus, it is noteworthy
that the remaining Cuban sugar interests consisted of a sizable number
of small producers. They were not, therefore, "similarly situated" with
the larger American interests. At that, the Cuban interests were seized
by the Castro Government less than two months later, on October 13,
1960.111 The only sugar enterprises thereafter remaining in private hands
were French and Spanish owned mills controlling but 1.22 per cent of the
entire industry.112 Even conceding that the existence of discrimination
can be determined only by reference to persons and properties "similarly
situated," it thus becomes difficult to find a discriminatory effect even
within the scope of the Cuban sugar industry.
Indeed, a finding of discrimination becomes even less tenable when
the entire factual context of the C.A.V. seizure is taken into account.
This assumes special importance given the circuit court's emphasis on
the time differential between Law No. 851 and Law No. 890. Avowedly
in response to the sharp reduction of the Cuban sugar quota, Law No. 851
was nevertheless part of a program of broad social and economic reform
seeking to create the revitalized Cuban society envisioned over sixty
years ago by Cuban patriot Jos6 Mart".113 Beginning with the passage of
the Agrarian Reform Law on May 17, 1959,114 "the first measure by the
Castro regime to have any far-reaching effect on Cuba's economic
structure," 115 Cuba initiated reforms affecting aliens and nationals
alike. During the six month period in which C.A.V. was seized, multi-
family dwellings, public utilities, other sugar companies, oil refineries,
banks and trading companies were also nationalized. 116 Considering that
the ultimate effect of all Cuban nationalizations in all industries might
110 Carrying this to its logical conclusion, "there is as yet no rule of international
law which provides that a State is guilty of illegal discrimination if it nationalises
alien property in a field where there are no national interests capable of being
affected." WiTrr, THE NATIONALISATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 144 (1961).
111 On the other hand, perhaps this relatively small time gap indicates a similarity
rather than a disparity in treatment.
112 See INT'L COMM'N OF JURIsTs, CUBA & THE RULE OF LAW 13 (1962).
113 See generally, Gray, Jose Marti and Social Revolution in Cuba, 5 J. INTER-
AmERICAN STUDIES 249 (1963).
1i4 Official Gazette (June 3, 1959); Special Issue No. 7 of the Annual Series.
115 RuLE OF LAW 60.
116 Id. at 5-6, 105. See also Reeves, The Cuban Situation: The Political and Eco-
nomic Relations of the United States and Cuba, 17 Bus. LAw. 980, 982-85 (1962). In
view of this wide-sweeping program it is arguable that C.A.V. would have eventually
been nationalized in any event, with or without the impetus of the quota reduction.
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have evidenced few if any differences in treatment between aliens and
nationals,117 it is lamentable that neither court felt called upon to ex-
plain the propriety of confining their inquiry to the sugar industry.
Given the uncertainty of properly finding a violation of the traditional
"rule" of nondiscrimination, did Cuba breach international law by its
avowed retaliation, in and of itself? Both courts appear to have so held.
However, their holdings posit a questionable concept of illegality under
customary international law.
The concept of nonretaliation, prior to Banco Nacional, was ap-
parently first advanced in connection with the Indonesian seizures of
Dutch property in 1958 in admitted retaliation for Dutch refusal to
transfer sovereignty over West New Guinea.118 It was again posed by the
Belgian delegate to the United Nations upon the seizure of Belgian
properties by the United Arab Republic in 1960.119 Although the Belgian
claim was not mentioned by either court, both referred to the retaliatory
Indonesian nationalizations. While the district court did not define the
concept, the court of appeals did so by quoting from a statement of the
American Branch of the International Law Association's Committee on
Nationalization of Property that "under International Law, a state may
not take foreign interests as a measure of political reprisal."'120 The
Court then cited Section 205 of the Restatement, Foreign Relations Law
of the United States, which provides in part:
When an alien is injured by conduct attributable to a state
for which a state would otherwise be responsible under inter-
national law, the state is not excused from responsibility merely
because its conduct is in retaliation against conduct of the state
of the alien's nationality, even if the conduct of the second state
is wrongful under international law.12 1
117 The nationalization of an entire industrial sector or, indeed, of an entire
economy cannot be accomplished overnight. The Soviet nationalizations took place
over a three year period. See 2 CARR, THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION: 1917-23, 43-47, 99,
128-29 (1952). Indeed, the Mexican Revolution which began in 1910 and which involved
the seizure and regulation of foreign property interests is still not at an end. In seek-
ing to ascertain the presence or absence of discrimination, therefore, it would be more
realistic at least to look to all of the known Cuban nationalizations, before and after
the seizure of C.A.V., in order to ascertain the overall ultimate effect of the treatment
accorded Cubans and aliens.
118 See Domke, Indonesian Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Courts, 54 Am.
J. INT'L L. 305 (1960); Baade, Indonesian Nationalization Measures Before Foreign
Courts-A Reply, 54 Am. J. INT'L L. 801 (1960); McNair, The Seizure of Property and
Enterprises in Indonesia, 6 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 218 (1959).
119 See Domke, Foreign Nationalizations: Some Aspects of Contemporary Interna-
tional Law, 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 585, 601 (1961).
120 PROCEEDINGS AND CofMirrrEE REPORTS 68 (1957-58), cited in 307 F.2d at 865.
121 Proposed Official Draft, 1962, cited in 307 F.2d at 865.
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These are the only ostensibly authoritative statements of the concept
of nonretaliation known to the authors. Their authoritativeness, however,
is open to question. In addition to the fact that each was drawn ex-
clusively by United States legal scholars, both are conspicuously un-
substantiated by any established trend of decision.122 Quite likely each
represents more American policy preferences than prescriptions of
customary international law.
The concept of nonretaliation as applied in Banco Nacional is a
questionable aberration of the doctrine of reprisals which traditionally
permits otherwise unlawful responses as sanctions against prior unlaw-
ful acts. 123 Historically, this doctrine refers to the private seizure of alien
property in retaliation for international delicts. As Brierly has noted,
it was formerly "not uncommon for a state to issue 'letters of marque' to
one of its own subjects, who had met with a denial of justice in another
state, authorizing him to redress the wrong for himself by forcible action,
such as the seizure of property of subjects of the delinquent state."' 24
While such "special" reprisals are no longer generally employed in
diplomatic practice, some scholars continue to restrict the doctrine solely
to governmental seizure or restraint of alien property. 25 The generally
more accepted view, however, is to consider a reprisal as "any kind of
coercive action not amounting to war whereby a state attempts to secure
satisfaction from another for some wrong which the latter has com-
mitted against it.126
Highly disruptive economic strategies have thus been employed as
instruments of coercive policy, extending from the most mild to the most
intense, in situations short of war. There is, however, a growing legiti-
mate skepticism as to the legality of such reprisals, especially if they are
not commensurate with the precipitating delict. 127 Scholarly concern,
122 The Proceedings and Committee Reports of the American Branch of the In-
ternational Law Association cite no authorities for this proposition. The comment
accompanying § 205 of the RESTATEMENT, while failing to cite any authority, illustrates
the proposition with an example seemingly based upon the district court's decision.
123 See BRICGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 957-58 (2d ed. 1952); HINDMARSH, FORCE IN
PEACE 58 (1933); STONE, LEGAL CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 289 (1954); Mc-
Dougal & Feliciano, International Coercion and World Public Order: The General
Principles of the Law of War in McDOUGAL, STUDms IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 237, 297-
305, 318-19 (1960).
124 BRIERLY, THE LAw OF NATIONS 297 (4th ed. 1949). As to early English practice
see Clark, The English Practice With Regard to Reprisals by Private Persons, 27 AM.
J. INT'L L. 694 (1933).
125 BRIERLY, Op. cit. supra note 124.
126 Ibid.
127 The Drago Doctrine, formulated in 1902, was an early attempt to regulate
reprisals by prohibiting armed intervention or territorial occupation to collect debts
in South America. Today, U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4, prohibits "the threat or use
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therefore, focuses upon the reappraisal of circumstances in which
reprisals may lawfully be applied to redress a wrong. A widely cited
attempt is that of the German-Portuguese Arbitral Tribunal in the
Naulilaa Case (1928) involving personal injuries to German nationals in
Portuguese territory.128 The Tribunal posed three conditions of legiti-
macy: (1) The State against which the reprisal is taken must first be in
breach of international law; (2) the reprisal must be "preceded by a
request for redress (sommation) which has been unavailing"; and (3)
there must be "a proportionality between the reprisal and the offense."
Thus, the concept of nonretaliation-that notwithstanding a precipitat-
ing unlawful act, a State may not seize the property of nationals of the
initially delinquent State-is a complete reversal of the traditional
doctrine of reprisals. The criteria formulated in the Naulilaa Case, how-
ever, accurately restate this historic doctrine. For the most part, they also
effectively fulfill the needs of a meaningful Law of State Responsibility;
that is, they seek to achieve a balance between exclusive national
interests.
By invoking and applying the doubtful nonretaliation concept, the
courts thus repudiated the historic distinction between justifiable and
unjustifiable response. This enabled them to give short shrift to Banco
Nacional's defense that the C.A.V. nationalization was justified because
"the United States was the first offender against international law by an
attempt to coerce Cuba through the reduction of American purchases of
Cuban sugar." 2 9 Both courts flatly denied any such United States
transgression. The court of appeals stated that
whether she was wise or unwise, fair or unfair, in what she did,
the United States did not breach a rule of international law in
deciding, for whatever reason she deemed sufficient, the sources
from which she would buy her sugar. We cannot find any
established principle of international jurisprudence that requires
a nation to continue buying commodities from an unfriendly
source.
130
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.
Article 15 of the O.A.S. Charter rejects any "form of interference or attempted threat
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic or cultural ele-
ments." For comments reflecting the growing skepticism of harsh economic and other
reprisals, see DRIER, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND THE HEMISPHERE
CRISIs 32 (1962); KAPLAN 9- KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw ch. 8 (1961); Schacter, The Enforcement of International Judicial and Arbitral
Awards, 54 Am. J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (1960).
128 8 Recueil des Decisions des Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes 409, 422-25. (English
trans., in BRIGGS, op. cit. supra note 123, at 951-53.)
129 307 F.2d at 866.
130 Ibid.
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Indeed, by relying upon the Restatement and the Proceedings of the
American Branch of the International Law Association, the circuit court,
in effect, denied the relevance of any inquiry into the legality of the
sugar quota reduction.
Whether United States policy "was wise or unwise, fair or unfair,"
it might be considered by some as a recrudescence of that economic
intervention repudiated by the United States at the Seventh Pan-
American Conference in Montevideo in 1933 and in the Buenos Aires
Protocol of Non-Intervention of 1936.131 Indeed the United States' action
might legitimately be deemed a violation of her existing treaty obliga-
tions. Article 15 of the Charter of the O.A.S., to which the United States
and Cuba were both signatories in 1960,132 provides:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly
or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external
affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not
only armed force but also any other form of interference or
attempted threat against the personality of the State or against
its political, economic and cultural elements. 133
While experts may differ on whether the United States violated the O.A.S.
Charter,134 it is clear from this language that Banco Nacional's defense
merited at least minimum evaluation. Given the first of the criteria
formulated in the Naulilaa Case, Cuba's seizure of C.A.V. and other
American sugar enterprises may have been justified.
Pursuing the rationale of the Naulilaa Case, however, it does not ap-
131 Ibid. The courts should not have so summarily dismissed Banco Nacional's al-
legations. They might legitimately have found that the sharp quota reduction, given
the historically unique economic relation between the United States and Cuba was,
perhaps, not an action which should have been so abruptly vindicated by the courts.
For, in addition to threatening the entire Cuban financial structure, this exclusive
action flaunted Cuban expectations of economic stability. Like any favor once granted,
Cuba had come to look upon the sugar quota as her just due and her inalienable
right. Considering the complex interdependencies of the world community, the United
States unilateral strategy assumes questionable propriety.
132 Cuba was not expelled from the O.A.S. until January 31, 1962. RuLE OF LAw 7.
133 2 U.S.T. 2395; T.I.A.S. No. 2261; 119 U.N.T.S. 3. This was cited in Brief for
Appellant, p. 23, Banco Nacional, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
134 Perhaps by reducing the Cuban sugar quota on July 6, 1960, the United States
was reprising against Cuba, rather than vice versa, in response to the seizure of
American-owned oil refineries on June 29, 1960. Threats and counterthreats concerning
the sugar quota had been passing back and forth between Washington and Havana
before this time. On June 28, Fidel Castro threatened to seize all American property
if the quota was reduced. Moreover, perhaps the United States was reprising against
seizures of American property under the Cuban Agrarian Reform Law. Thus, appellant
correctly stated that "there is considerable doubt as to who was retaliating against
whom in the summer of 1960." Brief for Appellant, p. 22, Banco Nacional, 307 F.2d
845 (2d Cir. 1962).
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pear that Cuba attempted to obtain redress by less coercive means.13 5
This is suggested by the seizure of C.A.V. on the same day the United
States reduced the sugar quota. Of course, it may be too optimistic to
have expected a moderate Cuban reaction considering the hostility
then pervading United States-Cuban relations, the importance of sugar
to the Cuban economy, and a background of over a half-century of
deeply resented United States economic, if not political, hegemony.
Indeed, since reprisals are generally employed in contexts of varying
degrees of hostility, it is questionable if a requirement of good faith
subsequent protest can realistically serve as the ratio decidendi of any
decision. If this be so, the courts should then have pursued the third
criterion of the Naulilaa Case by inquiring into the "proportionality"
between the Cuban seizures and the possible initial breach of inter-
national law by the United States.
This, of course, is a matter about which reasonable men may differ.
While it may have been improper, if not unlawful, for Cuba to have
effected a strategy of severe economic reprisal which by-passed
alternative orderly processes of decision, it is not advisable to reject
such sanctions as last resort strategies to achieve law-conforming behavior.
As McDougal and Feliciano have noted, "it is a mistake to regard the doc-
trine of reprisals as a denial of law or of the possibility of law."' 3 6 Absent
an authoritative international policing mechanism, compliance with in-
ternational law depends upon mutual expectations of reciprocity and
restraint which, over time, assure a creative, equitable and efficient
balance of exclusive national interests. Hence, lest disproportionate
response rupture economic interaction, if not imperil human survival
itself, 3 7 the principal challenge today is to vindicate those coercive
strategies which both acknowledge the limitations of existing structures
of authority and simultaneously insure at least minimum security in a
tense and ideologically cloven world.
Of course, with the development and proliferation of techniques of
mass destruction, it may be necessary to invent new principles and
procedures which can effectively minimize resort to highly coercive
strategies. It is suggested, however, that the district court and the court
of appeals need not have discarded a practicable regulatory formula in
favor of a concept of dearly dubious origin. Had the courts inquired
135 Such less coercive strategies as appeals to the United Nations, the O.A.S., or the
International Court of Justice were apparently not employed.
136 McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 123, at 318.
137 In this connection, Cuba may be a case in point. While the unresolved property
seizures were perhaps not the principal cause of United States-Cuban hostilities, they
nonetheless supplemented those existing tensions which in their totality almost brought
the world to the brink of nuclear war.
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into a possible disproportionality between the United States action and
the Cuban reaction, their opinions would have been more persuasive and
less open to theoretical challenge. The courts' inability to adjudicate the
conflicting claims relating to discrimination without resorting to the
questionable nonretaliation concept, therefore, suggests that they may
have been "apologists for national policies determined by political arms
of government."'u 8  Moreover, their overly optimistic equation of
discrimination with retaliation did little to define the actual differences
in treatment accorded United States and Cuban citizens. Had they real-
istically appraised the factual context of Banco Nacional by focusing
upon the time-honored and functional doctrines of nondiscrimination
and reprisals, the expectations of future claimants might have been as-
sured greater stability. At the same time, the courts would have clarified
the common interest of the world community in achieving an economic
balance between conflicting claims for freedom, safety and abundance.
C. The Claim of Compensation
We come finally to the issue in Banco Nacional which assumes the most
decisive role in the Law of State Responsibility. Its ultimate resolution
is also the only aspect of the case with which the authors are in sub-
stantial but not unreserved agreement with the courts.
Noteworthy is the lack of any express statement in either opinion that
customary international law requires payment of "prompt, adequate
and effective" compensation for nationalized property. To the limited
extent that future claimants may be dissuaded from undue reliance upon
this orthodox compensatory standard, this apparent omission may prove
beneficial, for the standard has had limited utility in the post-1914 era.
Accordingly, it "must not be regarded as a technical rule for the assess-
ment of compensation."' 39 At most, the "rule" is "little more than a
preference assumed for bargaining purposes" to which claimants pay
ritualistic tribute in seeking to maximize their goal-values. 140 This ob-
servation is abundantly borne out by the practice of States in negotiating
global settlements. 41 Those who contend that "such practice [global
compensation agreements] does not amount to a new trend, much less
to an abrogation of the existing customary international law, but rather
138 KAPLAN & KATZENBACH, op. cit. supra note 127, at 270.
139 WHrrE, op. cit. supra note 110, at 243.
140 Dawson and Weston, Prompt, Adequate and Effective: A Universal Standard
of Compensation?, 30 FoRDHAM L. REv. 727, 757 (1962).
141 Id. at 740-49; WHrrE, op. cit. supra note 110, ch. 11. While nations representing
their deprived nationals may begin negotiating with demands for prompt, adequate and
effective compensation, the final settlement generally reflects compromise and adjust-
ment.
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to a compromise in a given situation,"' 42 perpetuate a parochial view of
international law. This is not to suggest, however, that the principle of
compensation is itself seriously challenged. Rather, contemporary debate
seeks to resolve how the timing, amount and form of compensation may
be realistically determined in the twentieth century context of extensive
foreign wealth deprivations. 143
Law No. 851 proferred compensation in thirty-year Cuban Government
bonds at a minimum two per cent interest per year. Neither court ex-
pressly criticized in theory either the timing (i.e., the promptness) or the
form (i.e., the effectiveness) of this plan. They were properly critical,
however, of attendant factual conditions which necessarily determined
its adequacy. Thus, both the interest payable on, and the ultimate
redemption of, the bonds were to be financed out of a specially segregated
fund derived from twenty-five per cent of the annual foreign exchange
received by Cuba from United States sugar sales exceeding three million
Spanish long tons at not less than 5.75 cents per English pound of raw
sugar. The courts found the scheme faulty for three reasons: 44 (1) The
sugar quota reduction made any sales to the United States unlikely,
if not impossible; (2) between 1950 and 1959, prior to the quota reduc-
tion, the average monthly price for Cuban raw sugar shipments to the
United States never exceeded 5.50 cents per English pound; and (3) in
only one year from 1950 through 1959, and in only three years from
1934 through 1959, did United States sugar purchases exceed three
142 Domke, supra note 119, at 609. See also LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR
ADJUDICATION BY NATIONAL COMMISSIONS 104-16 (1962).
143 The "rule" of "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation evolved during
the nineteenth century as a standard by which aliens sought reparation for lost prop-
erty. "Prompt" meant that compensation should be paid at the time of, if not before,
the taking; "adequate" meant that the compensation should equal the true market
value of the property; and "effective" meant that the indemnity should be paid in a
currency usable to the alien, preferably his own. The "rule" apparently was first
invoked in an extensive foreign wealth deprivation context during the aftermath of
the Mexican Revolution. In practice, despite its repeated invocation, prompt, adequate
and effective compensation has never been paid in an extensive deprivation. Few
States could afford to restructure their economies if its strictures were faithfully ob-
served. Insistence upon the "rule" flies in the face of twentieth century realities and
is foredoomed to failure. See Dawson and Weston, supra note 140. See also WHrrE, op.
cit. supra note 110, ch. 11. None of the alternate compensation techniques, however,
including global settlements, has been entirely satisfactory to deprived alien owners.
Commenting upon this fact one writer has observed: "One need only look to Cuba
to see that international claims law has become a billion dollar business. This recent
proliferation of claims, coupled with the reasonable expectation that the United
States-Cuban experience soon may be repeated elsewhere in one or more of the so-called
newer nations, has generated renewed interest in the study of various methods of
peaceably resolving such disputes." LiLLicH, op. cit. supra note 142, at 1.
144 The following facts may be found in 198 F. Supp. at 885-86 & n.28; 307 F.2d at
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million Spanish long tons. Realistically examined, these conditions made
any compensation, even assuming resumption of United States sugar
purchases, highly improbable.
Noting these circumstances, the district court categorically held that
"dearly, this is not adequate compensation within the requirements of
international law."'1 5 The circuit court, however, although acknowl-
edging the "illusory" nature of the proposed compensation,146 expressly
declined to rule that, "a government's failure, in and of itself, to pay
adequate compensation for the property it takes is a breach of interna-
tional responsibility . . . ."147 In addition, both courts disapproved
provisions pledging vague assurances of unilateral Cuban valuation of
the properties seized. 148
Theoretical arguments aside, there can be little objection to the
district court's finding that the surrounding conditions rendered the
proffered compensation meaningless. Neither can the circuit court be
criticized for calling the indemnity "illusory." Clearly, Cuba not only
failed to make a good faith offer of compensation, but she may also have
failed to acknowledge even a duty to compensate under international
law. 149 Because Cuba failed to meet even the most minimal com-
pensatory requirements, the courts properly found that Cuba had no
title to the C.A.V. property and correctly dismissed Banco Nacional's
complaint.
Neither opinion, however, is beyond criticism. By neglecting to define
"adequate compensation," Judge Dimock may have encouraged per-
petuation of the orthodox compensatory standard which has tradi-
tionally reflected the exclusive interests of the private investment com-
munity. Judge Waterman, on the other hand, was entirely too deferential
to the exclusive demands of the less developed nations, among which
Cuba is numbered.
Although the district court never referred to the terms "prompt" and
145 193 F. Supp. at 386.
146 307 F.2d at 862.
14T Id. at 864.
148 193 F. Supp. at 386; 307 F.2d at 862.
149 The terms of the Cuban compensation were so unrealistic as to cast serious
doubt upon Cuba's good faith willingness to compensate at all. Moreover, none of
the bonds mentioned in Law No. 851 have ever been offered. See Reeves, supra note
116, at 985. Also, Cuba's refusal to sign the moderate United Nations Resolution on
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, which provides that deprived owners
shall be paid "appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the
State, taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with
international law," raises further doubt about Cuba's acceptance of the principle of
compensation, even in its most general formulation. But see, N.Y. Times, March 8, 1961,
p. 9, col. 1, wherein Premier Castro stated that he might consider compensation if
the United States granted economic concessions to Cuba.
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"effective," its failure to define "adequate compensation" may inspire
future claimants on both sides of the wealth deprivation process to invoke
its decision as authority for their opposing objectives. The conflicting
scholarly opinion cited by the district court for the "rule" that a failure
to pay "adequate" compensation violates international law makes this
dear.15 0 For example, Lord McNair maintains that "prompt, adequate
and effective" compensation must always be paid, even in nationaliza-
tions.151 The late Sir Hirsch Lauterpacht has noted, however, that in con-
texts "involving fundamental changes in the political system and
economic structure of the State," partial compensation may suffice. 152
Article 10 of the Harvard Draft, also cited by Judge Dimock, while
insisting that "adequate" and "effective" compensation represent the
"fair market value of the property taken" (undepressed by anticipa-
tion of the seizure) and that it must be "in a currency which the
claimant can freely use and at an exchange rate which is most favor-
able to him," would relax the requirement of "prompt" compensation in
cases of general socio-economic reform.153 Finally, Hackworth's Digest of
International Law cites voluminous and equally divergent positions.
The ambiguity already inherent in Judge Dimock's failure to define
"adequate compensation" is thus intensified. Moreover, when looking to
the factual circumstances upon which Judge Dimock relied, his failure
to define "adequate compensation" becomes more significant. Was his
conclusion based upon Cuba's decision to pay in bonds? Was it because
the bonds could not be redeemed for thirty years? Was it due to Cuba's
policy of unilateral valuation? Or, was it simply that United States-Cuban
trade statistics rendered the compensation fund illusory? Indeed, use
of the word "adequate," itself part of the orthodox trilogy and therefore
associated with traditional preferences for "full" or "fair market" value,
placed upon the court an especial responsibility to define that term.
Clearly, failure to do so and failure to reconcile the conflicting com-
mentaries cited limit the future authoritativeness of this decision to
situations substantially similar to Banco Nacional. If this ruling is used,
albeit improperly, to predict uniform restrictions which States may
reasonably be expected to accept, the outmoded orthodox compensatory
standard may be unduly fortified.
150 193 F. Supp. at 385 n.26.
151 McNair, supra note 118, at 249-53.
152 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 352 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955). It is not dear,
however, whether Judge Lauterpacht would have further modified the orthodox
standard.
153 Harvard Draft Research, Draft Convention on the International Responsibility
of States for Injuries to Aliens (1961), in Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility of States for
Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens, 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 545, 553-54 (1961).
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The willingness of the court of appeals to avoid identifying as a
fundamental principle of international law "some principle which in
truth is only an aspect of the public policy of our own nation and not a
principle so cherished by other civilized peoples,"' 54 merits applause. To
the extent that the court questioned the applicability and, therefore, the
authoritativeness of this orthodoxy to extensive deprivation contexts, the
danger that future claimants might invoke the appellate decision as
authority for that standard is minimized. Nevertheless, the court found
that Cuba "failed to provide adequate compensation."' 5 And like the
district court, the circuit court neglected to explain "adequate compensa-
tion." For the reasons outlined above, the future value of its opinion is
limited.
The circuit court decision is vulnerable for yet another reason. Un-
necessary confusion was generated by its refusal to hold that failure to
pay "adequate" compensation is, in and of itself, a violation of interna-
tional law. 55 If by "adequate compensation" the court meant "prompt,
adequate and effective," it properly refused to find a breach of interna-
tional law for, as noted, no consensus exists on the compensatory
standard applicable to extensive foreign wealth deprivations. On the
other hand, if the court meant that failure to pay compensation of any
kind is not of itself an international delict, it misstated the Law of
State Responsibility.
The latter alternative is the more probable since the court narrowed
its inquiry to whether or not failure to pay "adequate compensation"
when accompanied by retaliation and discrimination violates interna-
tional law. This is the minority position commonly associated with Sir
John Fischer Williams who maintained that, absent treaty or contractual
obligation, States are not required to compensate for the taking of
alien property unless discrimination is also present. 57 As the corner-
stone of the Law of State Responsibility, 5 s however, the duty to pay
154 307 F.2d at 861.
155 Id. at 862.
156 Id. at 864. The court of appeals was severely criticized for assuming this position
by A.B.A. COMM1rEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT, SECTION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, THE PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY INVESTED ABROAD
10 (1963): "The doubts thus cast by one of the leading courts of the country on the
international responsibility of a State for a failure to pay prompt, adequate and
effective compensation for the taking of alien-owned property appear to be based on
a small minority of writers, including the author of an 'unpublished paper' in the
Yale Law School Library!"
157 See Williams, International Law and the Property of Aliens, 9 BRrr. YB. INT'L L.
1 (1928).
158 Indeed, we submit, if deprived aliens were given satisfactory reparation for lost
investments, it is unlikely they would seriously complain of discriminatory or retalia-
tory treatment or of the absence of public utility in the taking.
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compensation should not be made dependent upon any other claim of
illegality. If less developed nations expect to attract a constant and ac-
celerating flow of private foreign capital, there must be at least minimal
assurance that investors will not be forced to foresake entirely the
fruits of their labor. As S. N. Guha Roy has noted, reparation for alien
property seized is "a germinal principle of bare justice."' 59 Indeed, it is
perhaps the sole principle of the Law of State Responsibility which
enjoys near universal acceptance, even by collectivist societies. 160 Just as
adherence to orthodox prescriptions of "prompt, adequate and effective"
compensation raises unwarranted expectations within the private invest-
ment community, so may the circuit court's finding create among less
developed nations the unjustified assumption that alien property can
be taken without indemnification as long as the seizure is untainted by
discrimination or retaliation. The court evidently did not realize that
the concern of contemporary debate is not the principle of compensation
itself, but the formulation of techniques consistent with the inclusive
interests of the world community by which the timing, amount and form
of compensation can be effectively determined.
The Cuban legislation pursuant to which C.A.V. was nationalized
failed to meet the most minimal compensatory requirements of the Law
of State Responsibility. To the extent that both courts acknowledged
this fact, their decisions cannot be impugned. But their failure to project
realistic policies which reciprocally derive from and nourish the common
interest of the world community in achieving a creative, equitable and
efficient balance between demands both for socio-economic reform and
private profit gives their opinions limited utility as meaningful guidelines
for future decision. Their imprecision and lack of clarity, it is feared,
159 Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Uni-
versal International Law?, 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 863 (1961). As Grotius once stated: "Fault
creates the obligation to make good the loss." GRoTtus, ON THE RIrrs oF WAR AND
PEACE 430 (1646 ed. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace transl., 1925). Simi-
larly, Eagleton has stated: "Historically, the idea of a responsibility between states
may be traced back to the vague origins of rights and duties which have always been
regarded as fundamental by mankind. Among these is the conviction that reparations
should be made for an injury committed; and this idea of responsibility, whether be-
tween persons or States, is as old as morality itself." EAGLETON, THE RIsPON5siiLrrY OF
STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 16 (1928).
160 For commentary that the principle of compensation is accepted by members of
the Communist world, in their legislation and in international agreements to which
they have been parties, see WHITE, op. cit. supra note 110, at 232-34; Bindschedler, La
Protection de Propriete Privee en Droit International Public, 90 HAGuE REcEUIL DES
Cous 173, 252-71 (1956); Foighel, Nationalization. A Study of the Protection of Alien
Property in International Law, 27 NORDISK TmssKRiFT FOR INTERNATIONAL RET. 143, 145-
47 (1957); Katzarov, The Validity of the Act of Nationalisation in International Law, 22
MODERN L. REv. 639, 647 (1959); Seidl-Hohenveldern, Communist Theories on Confisca-
tion and Expropriation, Critical Comments, 7 Ahi. J. Comp. L. 541 (1958).
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will only sow confusion on both sides of the foreign wealth deprivation
process.
V. CONCLUSION
Looking dispassionately at the present uncertain force of the Law of
State Responsibility as an effective shaping force in the struggle for
foreign investment security, one cannot escape asking through what
deficiencies in judgment or skill international law decision makers have
failed to focus upon the trend of world affairs. To answer that recent
developments have caught us unaware or that they are but temporary
deviations from the "normal" flow of human events is a counterfeit
apology, reflecting an artless view of history. Rather, the difficulty sug-
gests that scholars and jurists, in quest of legal certainty, have failed to
maintain a firm grasp upon the broad policy objectives of a con-
temporary Law of State Responsibility.
Such was the failing of the courts in this case. Their proper dismissal
of Banco Nacional's complaint, therefore, may be justified less by
inspired sensitivity to the fundamental community policies at stake than
by Cuba's dearly flagrant defiance of the most elemental sanction of inter-
national law in this area.
Indispensable to the effective future functioning of the Law of State
Responsibility, however, and hopefully destined to distinguish the
deliberations of the Supreme Court, is the creative search for and ap-
plication of policy capable of meeting the challenge of new and ever-
changing patterns of social, economic and political interaction. Pious
obeisance to allegedly precise, immutable and eternal "rules," on the
other hand, serves only to wedge the mind into traditional molds and
thereby to impose an impossible rigidity upon the processes of historical
change.
We must therefore relinquish the deceptive notion that the Law of
State Responsibility is a "brooding omnipresence in the sky" consisting of
a "body of rules" which can be mathematically prescribed, invoked and
applied. All legal "rules" are, in a sense, verbal mirages, fictions. They
are, as Jerome Frank once described them, "but psychological pulleys,
psychical levers, mental bridges or ladders, means of orientation, modes
of reflection, 'As-Ifs,' convenient hypostatisations, provisional formula-
tions, sign-posts, guides."'161 The sooner we recognize this and the sooner
we focus upon the ends sought to be achieved, as well as the reasons for
achieving them, the more quickly will we augment legal certainty in this
area. So doing, we will also better assure the greater production and
wider sharing of economic and other values.
161 FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 167 (1930).
